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In De Anima 3.2 Aristotle presents an account of perceptual consciousness in his 
theory of perceiving that we perceive. The aim of this dissertation is to determine 
whether Aristotle’s account in this chapter can be understood comparatively to 
contemporary intuitions about consciousness. My thesis deals with the issue of how 
we perceive that we see and hear, including discussions of other special senses. The 
issues of what Aristotle means by perceiving that we see by sight, and whether it is 
the faculty or the activity of sight that is perceived are under scrutiny in this chapter. 
The second chapter is concerned with how we perceive the special sensibles, and 
includes an investigation of the problem Aristotle poses: that perceiving that we see 
by sight entails the colouration of the perception of sight by the special sense object. 
The third and final chapter is concerned with the discussion of perceiving the 
common sensibles and the debates surrounding this, for instance the nature of the 
common sense and its power to perceive unitary moments of perception. Each of 
these issues in De Anima 3.2 is discussed with reference to the texts; some of which 
are included in Appendices for the benefit of the reader; while also taking the debates 
by modern scholars in to account to gauge the fullest understanding of the importance 




























Introduction: Is ‘perceiving that we perceive’ consciousness?  
 
In De Anima 3.2, Aristotle claims that “since we can perceive that we see and 
hear, it must either be by sight that we perceive that we see, or by another sense.” In 
this single sentence he makes an assumption that we have the ability to be reflexively 
aware of our perceptions of sensible objects.
1
 The existence of this ability is not an 
issue for Aristotle, who seems to take this awareness for granted. The problem for 
Aristotle is how this is possible, and indeed this is a problem for students of Aristotle. 
‘Consciousness’ in this essay will be understood as the general common-sense 
contemporary notion of the term. Rather than a philosophical - neurobiological 
comparison I am interested in whether Aristotle’s thinking can help everyday thought 
and philosophy. Consciousness can be defined from a general perspective as full 
activity of mind and senses in waking life; in a more specific account as awareness of 
one’s existence, sensations, thoughts, surroundings, and relation to these; and even 
more specifically defined as giving particular attention to an immediate object of 
concentration.
2
 The definition and understanding of perceiving that we perceive will 
form the majority of the discussion of this piece of writing as I will be trying to 
determine whether Aristotle’s conception of this ability can amount to an 
understanding of consciousness as is commonly understood today. A modern problem 
which may arise from Aristotle’s assumption that we can perceive that we see and 
hear is the way in which we should examine this issue. Whether ‘how we perceive 
that we see and hear’ is to be understood as a metaphysical question of how this 
happens, an epistemological question of how we know that this happens, or a 
phenomenological question of what it is like for this to happen. I propose to deal with 
the metaphysical and only touch on the phenomenological and epistemological 





                                               
1
 Aristotle, De Anima 3.2, 425b12 - See Appendix 1, t1 
2 Oxford English Dictionary 2004: 303; Shields Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: Consciousness 
2010, 3-4  
3
 References to all articles and books will be given first by the author’s full name, the title of the piece 
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Understanding Aristotle’s theory of perception in its wider context of the rest of 
the De Anima as well as other relevant works throughout the Aristotelian corpus is an 
important part of interpreting Aristotle’s meaning accurately. Aristotle’s discussion of 
perceiving that we perceive encompasses being aware of one’s environment through 
perception; however, it is not clear that his account, at least of perceptual awareness, 
includes being aware of your thoughts and feelings concerning these perceptions. 
Since I am interested in comparing consciousness to Aristotle’s theory of perceiving 
that we perceive I will concentrate my discussion on the theory of conscious 





It will be helpful to explain Aristotle’s theory of the potential and the actual 
before examining the problems of his use of it in relation to his account of the 
processes involved in perception in more detail.
5
 In De Anima 2.5 Aristotle theorises 
that the faculty of perception has no actual, but only potential existence. He gives the 
example of fuel not being able to set itself alight unaided by a spark, to exemplify 
how perception cannot perceive unassisted by the presence of an actual perceptible 
object. Aristotle’s theory of perception works on the premise that everything is acted 
upon by something which produces an effect and actually exists.
6
 For Aristotle what 
actually exists in the world are the perceptible objects.
7
 Aristotle distinguishes 
between the potentiality and the actuality of sensing by comparing it to the possession 
of knowledge and the exercise of it. Within this distinction Aristotle clarifies that 
there are two senses in which we speak of something as potential; as consisting of the 
right kind of matter to make actual knowledge (or sensing) possible, and as already in 
possession of the knowledge (or sensing ability) in a state of availability for use. The 
difference between the example Aristotle is using and the sensing which he is 
describing through this example is that knowledge of this second potentiality is 
available for use whenever one wishes, while perception is available for use only 
when a perceptible object if present.
8
 The difference between these two processes, 
Aristotle says, is that one becomes its actuality through qualitative alteration by 
                                               
4 See Appendix 5- on the connection between consciousness in the perceptual and intellective faculties. 
5
 See Appendix 2 
6
 Appendix 2, t4, 417a17-19 
7
 Appendix 2, t9, 417b25-6 
8 Appendix 2, t3, 417a3-10 
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means of learning and after frequent changes from a contrary state, whereas the other 
kind passes by a different process from the inactive possession of sensation or 
grammar to its exercise. Aristotle explains further, that even the term ‘being acted 
upon’ has more than one meaning.
9
 The process of the action of the sensible object on 
the sense, then, sometimes means a kind of destruction of sensing by its contrary; 
which is the usual meaning of being affected; and sometimes it means rather a 
preservation of that which is potentially like by something actual that is like it. 
Aristotle says that this latter process can be described as either not an alteration at all, 
for the development is into its real self or actuality, or else is a unique kind of 
alteration.
10
 As a means of clarifying this Aristotle says that that which thinks is not 
altered when it thinks and reinforces his theory on the role of the actual and the 
potential in sensation in his repetition, again, actual sensation corresponds to the 
exercise of knowledge, to claim that that which senses is not altered when it senses. 
This will be discussed in chapter two.  
 
The continued use of such terms as ‘being acted upon’ and ‘altered’ is explained 
in the existence of no words to describe the distinction which Aristotle has just made. 
However he does advise us to bear in mind the difference between the potentialities 
and the processes they undergo in discussions following on from this. So when 
Aristotle says in this chapter, assume that being acted upon is the same as exercising 
the function, he means that the exercising of perception is caused by the process of 
being acted upon by the sense-object such that perception is moved from a second 
potentiality to a first actuality. This process of the actualisation of sensation explains 
perception as one process connecting the perceiver and the perceived in a single 
episode as a single thing in a particular moment. When De Anima 2.5 is taken into 
consideration when one examines the following discussion in De Anima 3.2 on how 
we perceive these moments of perception, one can see how Aristotle provides a 
unitary theory of perception and perceptual consciousness. The ‘alteration’ in first-
order perception is a move from second potentiality to first actuality, whereas the 
move from first actuality to second actuality is what characterises perception of 
perception; resulting in this unifying multi-way dependence for actualisation. 
 
                                               
9
 Appendix 2, t7 
10 Appendix 2, t7, 417b7-10 
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Commentators have put forward differing views on whether there is a concept of 
consciousness present in Aristotle. Myles Burnyeat dedicated a whole paper to the 
problem whether Aristotle’s theory of mind is relevant in modern philosophy of mind, 
claiming that Aristotelian philosophy of mind is no longer credible because 
Aristotelian physiology is no longer so.
11
 The reason for Burnyeat’s belief in the 
irrelevance of Aristotle to contemporary thinking about the mind is that since 
Descartes people have been aware of the problem of the connection of our mind, or 
our conscious thinking selves, to our body and to the world outside our body, and 
hence have been trying to solve this separation. Burnyeat’s claim is that current 
worries about the connection between the body and the mind are problems faced by 
all thoughtful philosophers today.
12
 My problem with this is that I prefer Aristotle’s 
unification of the mental faculties with the functions of the body and the environment 
to any theory which separates these things. So where Burnyeat considers Descartes 
revelation about the issue of the relation of body to mind, I find Aristotle’s lack of 
preoccupation over this issue refreshing. What Burnyeat names Descartes’ 
“demolition of Aristotelian philosophy”
13
 I view rather as an obstacle in Aristotle’s 
way to helping us achieve an understanding of mind, (or soul), body, and the world in 
which these things share existence. Though Aristotle was mistaken about the action of 
the perceptual object, he was right about the necessity of the presence of a perceptual 
object for actual perception to take place and I think he was right to reject the kind of 
consciousness which Descartes postulated, which was originated by his mentor, Plato.  
 
Richard Sorabji, who opposes Burnyeat’s interpretation of Aristotle, explains 
that the reason why Burnyeat thinks that an Aristotelian philosophy of mind is no 
longer credible because it turns the matter of animal bodies into something pregnant 
with consciousness, whereas we are wedded to Descartes’ conception of matter as 
distinct from awareness, hence the awareness requires explanation.
14
 I would like to 
propose however that our conception of consciousness be prised away from 
Descartes’ legacy, to enable us to rethink the nature of our awareness in a more 
Aristotelian manner. Michael Frede appears to think that we have already established 
                                               
11 Burnyeat, M. Is an Aristotelian Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? A Draft, in  
Essays on Aristotle’s ‘De Anima’ 1992: 16 
12
 Burnyeat 1992: 16 
13
 Burnyeat 1992: 16 
14 Sorabji Aristotle’s Theory of Sense Perception, in Essays on Aristotle’s ‘De Anima’ 1992: 211 
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our separation from thinking in line with Descartes, so far as to support the opinion 
that Aristotle’s view, indirectly, has considerable bearing on our notion of the mind, 
to the extent that our notion of the mind is utterly opposed to the kind of notion 
Descartes has.
15
 In this way, Aristotle is in a much better position to reject Platonist, 
and through their connection, Cartesian, dualism, by resisting Plato’s narrow 
conception of the physical. It is Aristotle’s illustration of the importance of the 
physical for the actual existence of anything other which provides the unity to his 
view of perceptual consciousness.  
 
Kathy Wilkes propounds Aristotle’s theory of psuche to be a far better term to 
discuss these issues than the concept of the mind in current debates concerning that 
area.
16
 This appears to be precisely because of the connection with Descartes’ 
conception of the mind still held as a concern simply by using that word. Wilkes 
prefers psuche to mind in the context of contemporary scientific psychology and 
philosophy partly because it is her opinion that Aristotle paid no attention to 
consciousness per se,
17
 meaning he paid no attention to any Cartesian concept of 
consciousness. Hamlyn, whom Wilkes cites as critical support for this claim, differed 
from her in that he deplored the lack of a theory of consciousness as we know it now 
in Aristotle’s psychological theory.
18
 Hamlyn claims that Aristotle begins and ends 
De Anima 3.2 with an account of perceptual self-consciousness, describing the 
philosopher as seeking something like the notion of a unity of consciousness but not 
achieving one comparable to the contemporary notion.
19
 I disagree, finding Wilkes’ 
view more compelling, and I gladly accept Everson’s statement that it would be 
senseless to acknowledge that Aristotle created an analysis of cognition and desire as 
part of an attempt to explain human behaviour and doubt whether he offers a theory of 
the mind which we can relate to now.
20
 However, I unassumingly claim that 
Aristotle’s theory of mind can meet the objectives of the contemporary concerns in 
that area at least in some respects.  
 
                                               
15
 Frede, M. On Aristotle’s Conception of the Soul, in Essays on Aristotle’s ‘De Anima’ 1992: 94 
16 Wilkes Psuche vs. the Mind, in Essays on Aristotle’s ‘De Anima’ 1992: 109 
17
 Wilkes 1992: 109; 122 
18
 Hamlyn Aristotle’s De Anima 1968: xiii 
19
 Hamlyn 1968: 121 
20 Everson Aristotle’s Psychology, in the Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, 1995: 169-70 
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Caston explains commentators’ denial of the existence of a concept of 
consciousness in Aristotle by the difficulty of the fact that Aristotle uses many words 
to explain the phenomena, while we use one word to illustrate many phenomena.
21
 
Kahn argues that Aristotle’s Greek has no term which corresponds to the modern 
notion of consciousness for the process or condition of awareness as such.
22
 Yet 
Hardie criticises Kahn for his unhelpfulness. The modern notion of consciousness for 
Kahn means ‘the peculiar quality of mental existence’ with reference to Descartes, on 
the understanding that consciousness is synonymous with awareness in his claim that 
aisthesis provides a close parallel.
23
 Kahn’s claim is highly anachronistic, and Hardie 
reacts to this by specifying a general sense of consciousness, consciousness(g) and 
proposing to defend a more definitively affirmative answer to Kahn’s question of 
whether Aristotle has a notion of such a thing by comparing his theory to this more 
general understanding. By means of this generalisation and his contextualisation of 
Aristotle’s theory next to his contemporaries Hardie theorises that Aristotle affirms in 
his own idioms that animal behaviour is accompanied by consciousness(g).
24
 He was 
the first psychologist, and for him psychology without the conscious psuche would 
have been Hamlet without the Prince.
25
 Hardie goes further though, and states his 
opinion that since the 'psycho-' in 'psychology' 'psychosomatic' 'psychophysical' has 
the desired positive albeit neutral and generic implication, Greek philosophers, said to 
lack the concept, have in fact given us the words which best express it;
26
 a view which 
I agree with.   
 
The connection between body, consciousness and external environment is 
fascinating to me. Aristotle joins these together into a single unifying theory, 
combining faculties and activities into a coherent illustration of his theory of mind. It 
will hopefully become clear from this discussion that we can still learn from his 
philosophy, especially in his approach to philosophical study, research and theory, 
which is exemplified in his analysis of perceptual consciousness in the De Anima.  
 
                                               
21
 Caston Aristotle on Consciousness, 2002: 752 
22 Kahn Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle’s Psychology, 1966; 1978: 21 
23
 Hardie Concepts of Consciousness in Aristotle, 1976: 71 
24
 Hardie 1976: 394 
25
 Hardie 1976: 405 
26 Hardie 1976: 397 
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Having introduced this piece of writing with my aim of elucidating Aristotle’s 
theory of perceiving that we see and hear and comparing it to current conceptions of 
consciousness I will proceed to analyse in more detail his main chapter on this topic, 
De Anima 3.2. My following chapters will discuss the themes of perceiving that we 
perceive, perceiving the special sensibles, and perceiving the common sensibles. 
These chapters will cover Aristotle’s main worries about his theory of perceiving that 
we perceive and the ability to do this, as well as the ability to perceive differences 
between the objects of perception simultaneously with the ability to perceive the 
individual sense-objects. Some of the most important and widely agreed upon 
characteristics of human consciousness are unity, self-awareness, intentionality 
(consciousness of something) and recognition between cognitive objects.
27
 Aristotle’s 
theory of perceiving that we perceive connects with all four of these intuitions in 
some way. In the next three chapters I will investigate the nature of this connection, 
and then conclude on the matter of whether of not Aristotle truly has a notion of 


















                                               
27 Modrak Aristotle: The Power of Perception 1981: 163-4 
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Chapter One: Perceiving that we Perceive 
 
Aristotle’s concern at the beginning of De Anima 3.2 is how perceiving that we 
see and hear is possible. Aristotle’s central worries are firstly, whether we perceive 
that something is red at the same time as we perceive the red
28
 and how this can be 
possible, and secondly whether we perceive this by the same token as that by which 
we perceive the red.
29
 Aristotle states that we must perceive that we see by sight, 
rather than by any other sense. To answer the question of whether perceiving that we 
perceive is consciousness we must ascertain what Aristotle means by perceiving that 
we see by sight.
 30
 If by, by sight Aristotle means the process of sight, then this is an 
intuitive choice, for to see we must be aware that we are seeing, otherwise how would 
it count as seeing? In modern findings there are examples of perception that is not 
always accompanied by perceptual consciousness,
31
 but Aristotle did not know of 
these, hence he makes perceptual consciousness necessary to perception.
32
 This view 
is supported by Victor Caston, who similarly sees in Aristotle’s theory the essential 
nature of consciousness in the perceptual faculty.
33
 Aristotle’s conclusion presents a 
difficulty, and Aristotle proceeds to lay out an aporia: here is a difficulty: for if seeing 
is perceiving by sight, and what is seen is colour or has colour, then if one is to see 
that which sees, that which primarily sees will also have colour.
34
 The way in which 
this happens is the subject of an important debate where commentators are trying to 
determine how Aristotle’s theory of perceiving that we perceive works. Since I will be 
discussing this debate in my second chapter the focus in this chapter will be on the 
problem of how we perceive that we see by sight. 
 
In Aristotle’s discussion of perception generally in De Anima 2.5 he questions 
why we do not perceive the senses themselves separately from the sense-objects.
35
 
His answer to this question is exemplified by the similarity of the sense faculty to 
fuel, which is unable to produce an effect in itself without a spark to assist it. This 
                                               
28 ‘but then the same [sense] will be of sight and of colour, the object of sight’ – See Appendix 1, t2 
29
 ‘So that either two [senses] are of the same [object] or [sight] is of itself’ – See Appendix 1, t3 
30
 See Appendix 1, t1 
31
 Armstrong, David What is Consciousness? 1999: 725- In his example of the truck driver lacking 
introspective awareness 
32
 See Appendix 1, t1 
33
 Victor Caston Aristotle on Consciousness 2002: 786 
34
 See Appendix 1, t6 
35 See Appendix 2, t3, 417a3-4 
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illustrates the potentiality of the faculty until a perceptual object is present to be 
perceived,
36
 but through this explanation raises another question; how it can be 
possible that we are able to perceive our perceptual ability in states of darkness. 
Where there is no perceptible object to see,
37
 perception must remain in a state of 
potentiality. This example Aristotle uses to answer to his second worry: whether we 
perceive that we see by the same token as that by which we perceive the red, in an 
attempt to illustrate the multiplicity of meanings which to perceive by sight carries. 




Through the reference to the theory of the actual and potential Aristotle indicates 
which of the multiple meanings of ‘perceiving that we see by sight’ he intends to use 
here. By placing De Anima 3.2 in the context of Aristotle’s description of general 
perception in De Anima 2.5 Aristotle shows that our ability to perceive our lack of 
perception must also depend on the presence of a perceptible object. It is not clear 
though, how Aristotle thought that this was possible, since in darkness there seems to 
be no directly perceptible object for sight to perceive. I will offer three possible 
interpretations. Firstly, darkness could be seen to be perceptible in Aristotle’s theory 
because it in a way is coloured; for Aristotle says that the same conditions which in 
air produce light and darkness, in bodies produce white and black.
39
 Air and water 
have colour in On Sense, for their brightness is the nature of colour
40
; the proper 
objects of sight are colours, and shiny things.
41
 There is no question of there being 
perceiving without a perceptible object because perception does not exist without 
something for it to perceive.
42
 Even in the case of incidental perceptibles this is so, for 
they must accompany actual perceptible objects. Alternatively, we could be said to be 
able to be aware of our potential for sight despite the lack of a perceptible object 
through our memories of past perceptual experiences. This would connect De Anima 
3.2 with 3.3 and Aristotle’s treatise in the Parva Naturalia, On Memory. This 
connection however is not explicit, and is only one of the possible interpretations of 
                                               
36
 See Appendix 2, De Anima 2.5, and my introduction explaining the nature of the different senses of 
the potential and the actual. 
37
 See Appendix 1, t7 
38 See Appendix 1, t10 
39
 Aristotle On Sense and Sensible Objects, 439b18-20 
40
 On Sense, 439b1-2 
41
 Stephen Everson, Aristotle on Perception, 1987: 283 
42 See Appendix 2, t3, 417a3-10 
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this statement that we perceive that we see by sight. Although Aristotle does not 
mention phantasia or memory here, he could be anticipating his students’ further 
reading of connecting themes in the psycho-biological corpus.
43
 Contrary to this, it 
could be possible that Aristotle is simply attributing additional powers to the 
perceptual faculty as he does in the case of the power by what perceives that we 
perceive to perceive common sensibles, also by sight. The power to perceive that we 
can see in light and in darkness could be a theory that since we are aware of the 
actuality of the rest of our senses, we are aware that we are not asleep, and that 
possibly, when once more in suitable conditions for seeing, our sight will still be 
functional. In this case, it seems it can be possible for us to be aware of the 
potentiality of one of our senses, because of the activity of other senses; perceiving 
that we still have the ability to see, by our lack of sight. Whether perception alone is 
enough to account for the phenomenon of perceiving that we can see by sight when in 
darkness is unclear, and whether any of these interpretations are taken or not it is 
certainly clear that ‘to perceive that we see by sight’ has a multitude of meanings. In 
this example however, Aristotle connects essentially the perceiver, the conditions 
necessary for perception to occur, and the object of perception in one single moment, 
one action which has not yet happened but is perfectly possible to happen once we are 
in the presence of an actual object and in a condition of enough light to be able to see 




An example of how unclear Aristotle’s assumption that we perceive that we can 
see by sight is, is the rise of the debate over whether he is saying that we perceive that 
we see by the faculty of sight, or by the means of sight. For each of the three 
occurrences at 425b19 and b22, commentators have argued over whether the text 
should read to horõn or to horan.
45
 The third occurrence must read to horõn as this is 
immediately afterwards identified with the sense-organ. Hence the second occurrence 
must also read to horõn otherwise the third instance of this term, at b22, would have 
no point. So it is the first instance of the occurrence that is under dispute. The phrase 
can be read either in a capacity reading, where the perceptual capacity or sense organ 
is the thing being seen; or with an activity reading, where the activity of seeing is that 
                                               
43
 See Appendix 5- On the connection between consciousness in Aristotle’s theory of perceiving that 
we perceive, and his other psychological theories.  
44
 Appendix 1, t10 
45 See Appendix 1, t8 
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which is being seen. The way this phrase is translated determines the interpretation on 
which the whole of Aristotle’s theory of perceiving that we perceive will rest on. The 
interpretation assumed concerning this debate will also influence interpretations of 
how Aristotle’s claim that perception is coloured during the process of being acted 
upon by the sense-object
46
; which for the instances of sight rather than any other 
sense, is colour. The stance taken in this debate reflects on whether Aristotle has a 
theory of consciousness that is comparable to the contemporary conception of such, it 
will become clearer how as the discussion develops. 
 
Victor Caston and Thomas Johansen are at the forefront of this debate. Caston 
supports the view that perceiving that we perceive is an instance of the perception of 
the activity of an episode of perception,
47
 whereas Johansen supports an opposing 
view claiming that what is perceived is the faculty of perception, the sense-organ 
being acted upon by the sense-object.
48
 Johansen’s view, where the capacity perceives 
the faculty as it itself perceives the sense-object, appears to place the perceiving of 
perception at a slight distance from the process, interpreting the act of perceiving this 
as performed through sight, by the faculty of the ‘common sense.’ Caston’s activity 
reading on the other hand, suggests that it is the whole process of perception that 
perceives and hence this that is ‘coloured’ during the process. Since an activity cannot 
become coloured per se, this view seems to support the idea that instead of actually 
becoming coloured, the act of perception is coloured in a unique way, by becoming 
aware of the colours of the perceived object.
49
 Aristotle’s explanation for why what 
perceives the perceiving of colour must also see colour, and by inference become 
coloured itself, is that colour is the active part of this process.
50
 Therefore the object 
must act on the entire process for the simultaneity of this phenomenon to occur. Since 
the sense-object cannot act on the sense-organ alone because they are joined in their 
dependence on the sense-object, it must act on the activity of sight which includes the 
perceptual organ, and therefore the whole perceptual faculty. Hence the object of 
whichever perception is involved must therefore act on all factors involved in the 
perception.  
                                               
46 See Appendix 1, t6, t8 
47
 Victor Caston 2002: 769; 762-3  
48
 Thomas Johansen In Defense of Inner Sense: Aristotle on perceiving that one sees, 2005: 241 
49
 See Appendix 2, t7; cf. Myles Burnyeat 1992: 21, 22  
50 See Appendix 1, t11, t12 
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It will be enlightening for the question being discussed to investigate the 
implications which the differing sides of this debate have on Aristotle’s further 
remarks in De Anima 3.2. Caston states that Aristotle can contribute to two modern 
philosophical debates, on whether consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mental 
states or a higher order thought or perception; and on the debate concerning the 
qualitative nature of experience.
51
 His claim is that Aristotle’s theory is intuitive in 
both ways and capable of avoiding difficulties which are presented to both sides of 
each debate.
52
 It may be that Aristotle’s theory helps us better understand these issues, 
or it may be that by seeming to be useful to both views his theory is helpful to neither. 
The first debate which Aristotle has been discussed as useful to, for the purposes of 
this discussion, is the debate between those who take Aristotle to be an inner sense 
theorist, claiming that such perceiving that we see or hear is a second-order 
perception; and those who think that perceiving that we perceive for Aristotle is an 
intrinsic feature of first-order perception. Exemplifying the two sides of the debates 
are Thomas Johansen, who is an inner-sense theorist concerning interpretations of 
Aristotle, and Victor Caston, who supports the higher-order, intrinsic interpretation of 
Aristotle’s theory.  
 
Caston’s claim is that Aristotle theorises that any token perception instantiates 
two types of mental content: first-order, the intake of the sensible object and second-
order the perceiving of that sensible object.
53
 He declares the higher-order content and 
first-order content to be instantiated together in a perception and the consciousness 
involved to stand in a reflexive relation to itself.
54
 This reflexive awareness can be 
explained informatively because of its articulated structural form of intentionality. 
Caston asserts that Aristotle’s theory is an improvement on contemporary higher-
order theorists’ because he is able to elucidate consciousness in terms of intentionality 
while preserving the intuition that consciousness is intrinsic to mental states.
55
 This, 
Caston says, is the extent to which Aristotle’s theory of consciousness can be relevant 
today. Johansen on the other hand claims that Aristotle postulates an ‘inner sense’ 
                                               
51 Caston 2002: 752 
52
 Caston 2002: 752 
53
 Caston 2002: 753-4 
54
 Caston 2002: 757 




 This sense is internally connected to the perceptual 
states themselves through the ‘common sense.’
57
 He stresses the importance of 
considering how the five senses are related such that they can perceive objects beyond 
those available to them as special senses, and attempts to answer the problem of how 
we perceive that we perceive by signifying the uniting of the five special senses by 
the ‘common sense.’
58
 By claiming that the faculty responsible for second-order 
perception is itself perceptual, Johansen claims, there is no need to postulate another 
sense faculty, or attribute second-order powers to perception because this ‘inner-




My difficulty with this is that Aristotle says that the faculty, or ability, of 
perceiving that we see does not only have as its objects its own perceptual states but 
everything involved in a particular perceptual process, including the objects of first 
order perception.
60
 Caston’s interpretation on the other hand has the advantage of 
showing how Aristotle incorporates the common sense into the ability which enables 
us to be reflexively aware through perception itself without the possibility that any 
other sense, inside or outside perception, is needed. I am inclined to support to horan, 
and Caston’s activity reading, which fits best with Aristotle’s explanation of why 
perceptual consciousness, as a part of the perceptual faculty which includes the sense-
organ, becomes coloured when the sense organ does. This interpretation is supported 
by instances in Aristotle’s text where he refers us to his theory of actuality and 
potentiality to explain his complicated meaning. In the theory of actual and potential 
stated in De Anima 2.5, as exemplified by the fuel metaphor, the reaction of the 
faculty of perception depends on the action of the perceptible object.
61
 The relation 
between the theory of the acting object and the claim that we perceive that we see and 
hear indicates that Aristotle thought our ability to perceive that we can see and hear 
does not involve the sense generating this perception. This is because perception is 
potential until a sense-object is present,
62
 so it seems that this perception of our 
perceptions must be produced by the sense-object also. Following on this, it appears 
                                               
56
 Johansen 2005: 235 
57
 Johansen 2005: 236 
58 Johansen 2005: 236 
59
 Johansen 2005: 235 
60
 Appendix 1, t22, 426b35-432a 
61
 Appendix 2, t3 
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that on Aristotle’s account we do not perceive the senses themselves, but rather the 
individual episodes of perception of the sense-objects. This provides support for 
Caston’s activity reading.
63
 The inner-sense conception appears to intuitively remove 
consciousness from our processes and actions by attributing the powers of perception 
to a ‘common sense’ faculty as a power held over and above the special sensibles. 
Theories which place consciousness as a pervasive presence in all our perceptual acts 
however, fulfil the intuitions present in contemporary thought about the intrinsic 
nature of consciousness. Aristotle commits himself to the latter option, in many ways, 
but most simply, by making consciousness necessarily present in all perceptions. 
 
The second debate to which Aristotle has been said to lend assistance is to the 
debate concerning the nature of qualia, or conscious experience. Caston says that 
Aristotle’s account of what makes our first-order perceptions perceptible cuts down 
the middle of the two sides of this debate.
64
 He explains Aristotle’s contributions to 
each side: as support for modern day intentionalists, that for Aristotle, first-order 
experience does not possess the same perceptible qualities as the object of perception, 
colour, who claim that only perceptible objects literally have first-order perceptible 
qualities.
65
 Aristotle also shows support for the proponents of qualia according to 
Caston, whereby experience in Aristotle’s theory has some characteristic which 
makes it about perceptible qualities, and this characteristic is itself an object of 
awareness, which shows that the phenomenal character of our experience is not 




John Sisko however disagrees with Caston, putting forth the view that Aristotle 
in fact means that in any token perception the organ of perception literally acquires 
the perceptible qualities of its objects and claiming that this makes Aristotle’s view 
irrelevant to the contemporary debate over qualia.
67
 This adjoins with the debate 
concerning what Aristotle means when he says that perception is coloured by the 
perceptual object of sight when we perceive that we see. I will discuss this in more 
detail in the next chapter, for now I am concerned with its link to how we perceive by 
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sight. In De Anima 2.5 Aristotle says that perception is held to be a change of state
68
 
and then refers us to his defence of like and unlike equally being able to affect like.
69
 
With this reference Aristotle is trying to explain to us why the kind of change 
occurring in perception is not like material change, of quality, quantity, substance or 
place, which are the usual kinds of change involving material alteration described in 
the Physics.
70
 Through this discussion it is clear that perception, which is potentially 
like the sense-object, fulfils its true nature by becoming like it in actuality. This is the 
view that Myles Burnyeat purports in opposition to Richard Sorabji’s claim that 
perception is not a different kind of alteration, but similarly to others it is a 
replacement of one sensible quality by another.
71
 One can see Sorabji’s support for 
this literal interpretation in the discussion of how one thing becomes like something 
else from being unlike it. This passage seems to imply a stronger meaning of change 
than Burnyeat’s interpretation allows, however I have explained why the contrary 
interpretation, supported by Burnyeat is more faithful to Aristotle’s theory. Burnyeat 
claims that the reason that Sorabji’s interpretation is even available to us is because of 
our modern scientific advancement on the age Aristotle lived in.
72
 When compared 
with Aristotle’s explanation of the kind of change undergone in perception it is clear 
that Sorabji’s explanation is different to Aristotle’s.  
 
Opposing perception to the ordinary sense of the term where alteration and 
change indicate the loss of a quality and its replacement by another Aristotle explains 
that although we must continue to use the language of being affected and altered, we 
must understand these terms in the light of what has just been said.
73
 So we must read 
his repetition of the theory of unlike affecting and changing like, as being the same as 
like affecting like, because the sense-object is unlike perception in essence, but like it 
in potentiality.
74
 As Modrak puts it, the nature of the faculty is preserved in its 
exercise because its very nature is having a certain structure that it shares with its 
object.
75
 The importance of the connection between the actuality thesis and the 
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distinction between the types of alteration is signalled by Aristotle’s use of kathaper 
heiretai, as has been said.
76
 This emphasis on the point that the sentient subject is 
potentially such as the object of sense is actually strengthens the association of the 
sensing subject being altered only in this unique sense which involves no alteration. 
The stress on the role of the sentient subject which is what mainly concerns us now, is 
minimised in Aristotle’s theory to make way for his theory of the active object. 
Aristotle in the De Anima shows only the slightest inclination of concern relating to 
the debate over the nature of conscious experience. Expressions which lead us to 
value having the experience more than the experience itself,
77
 such as describing what 
that particular perception was ‘like’ are not found in the De Anima. Aristotle describes 
the sense-objects in terms of how they appear to us in our experience; coloured, 
sounding for example. However his concern about the perceptible nature of conscious 
experience is not linked to problems concerning the relation of a subject’s self-
conscious experience of the world in the way theorists concerned with this subject are. 
It seems that where modern thinking about the mind immediately jumps to concerns 
about our experience of the world, and our impact on the world, Aristotle was 
concerned more largely with the way the world impacts on us, such that the processes 
which connect us to that world are possible.  
 
Kosman claims that in De Anima 3.2 Aristotle is speaking of a form of self-
consciousness constituted in the reflexive awareness we have of our perceptual acts.
78
 
Kosman states two meanings of self-consciousness: consciousness of one’s self, and 
consciousness being conscious of itself as such.
79
 The latter is closer to Aristotle’s 
philosophical theory. However, consciousness as a part of oneself, being aware that it 
is having an act of perception and perceptual awareness, can hardly be unaware that it 
is something which is having that perception. To define perceiving that we perceive in 
this way though, would be to misunderstand Aristotle’s meaning and place him 
anachronistically in a context based on our history of anxiety about the separation of 
the Cartesian self. Aristotle displays no such worries; in his theory each is a part of 
the other, with the world as it is in actuality being prior to the potentially conscious 
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 It is in the actualisation of these perceptions, it seems, that the conscious 
agency of the perceiver is realised.
81
 The perceptible object would not complete its 
purpose of being ‘see-able’ if there was no conscious and ensouled being to see it and 
neither would the perceiver’s ability to perceive fulfil theirs.  
 
Perceiving that we perceive connotes a process which involves attending to your 
perceptions, a self-consciousness of the kind where one is conscious of what one is 
doing.
82
 This attention appears to be described more as a reaction to the action of the 
perceived object and hence is more passively conscious than actively so.
83
 Kosman 
however, suggests a more specific level of intentional and attentional introspection 
here, where perception consists of the mechanism occurring in the sense-organs and 
of the activity of apperceptive awareness which transforms that mechanism into 
perception proper, explaining the attribution of these apperceptive abilities as a 
condition of seeing, which constitutes perception.
84
 This view which places much of 
the emphasis of the phenomenon on the wary attention of the perceiver I will have to 
reject, in favour of what I see as a position closer to Aristotle’s own, where the 
activity of the object is determined to be Aristotle’s primary method for explaining 
perceiving that we perceive. In this issue I support Caston.  
 
The significance of Aristotle’s involvement in the debate over whether 
consciousness is intrinsic to our mental states or removed from them in an ‘inner-
sense’ capacity is not only a matter of getting to grips with what Aristotle intended to 
theorise, but with whether his theories can correspond to any today, and therefore be 
respected as useful not just in their historical significance. Aristotle’s part in the 
debate of the nature of consciousness has been established in this discussion as 
intrinsic to perceptual processes. His involvement in the issue of conscious experience 
is less clear. While Aristotle speaks of these perceptual processes in terms of our 
experience of them he does not mention the existence of the perceiver as a conscious 
subject of these experiences. How he manages these two views in conjunction will 
become clearer in the next chapter, on perception of special sensibles.  
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Chapter 2: Perceiving Special Sensibles 
 
The second worry Aristotle has about his theory that we perceive that we 
perceive by sight, concerns whether we perceive that something is red at the same 
time as we perceive the red.
85
 This concern is revealed by his statement but then the 
same sense will be of sight and of colour, the object of sight.
86
 This is problematic 
because the way in which perception takes on the colour of the perceptual object has 
an impact on what the whole theory of perceiving that we perceive means. The 
problem is how to understand what Aristotle means when he says that perception is 
coloured by the perceived object in the process of perceiving that we see. Aristotle’s 
second worry is inseparable from his first. Positions taken in the dispute over how 
that which primarily sees will also have colour
 87
 is to be translated and interpreted 
are influenced by the translation of the rest of the sentence surrounding this 
complicated inference concerning perceiving that we see by sight. As his students we 
are left to interpret his meaning based on our knowledge of the context of his previous 
arguments.  
 
As an explanation of the phrase that which sees is in a sense coloured
88
 Aristotle 
reiterates an earlier premise, that each sense organ receives the sense-object without 
its matter.
89
 This connection with De Anima 2.12 is an example of how Aristotle 
connects the parts of the De Anima, and is a reminder that we are meant to bear in 
mind his earlier remarks on the mechanisms of perception while we contemplate his 
later ones.
90
 The repetition of his earlier theory is within the context of an example 
that must be meant to remind us of the most famous example containing a wax 
impression. Just as the wax receives the impression of the signet-ring without the iron 
or gold so the perceptual capacity of the soul receives the impression of the perceptual 
object without its matter.
91
 Perception, through the perceptual object, could be said to 
                                               
85
 See Appendix 1, t2 
86
 See Appendix 1, t2 
87
 Appendix 1, t6, “if seeing is perceiving by sight, and what is seen is colour or has colour, then if one 
is to see that which sees, that which primarily sees will also have colour.” 
88
 See Appendix1, t8, 425b23  
89
 See Appendix 1, t8, and De Anima 2.12, 424a16 
90
 Cf. Appendix 2, t11 
91 De Anima 2.12, 424a18-21 
23/46 
be always potentially coloured, because it is always aware of the potential to be 
seeing.
92
 This is because we are always aware when perceiving, and asleep when not 
perceiving.
93
 When actually seeing, perception is in a way coloured, as it is aware of 
the form of the object being received by the sense-organ without its matter.
94
 This is 
how perception is coloured by the perceived object. In De Anima 2.12 Aristotle’s 
illustration of the theory by the model of the wax block,
95
 reveals Aristotle’s intention 
to apply to perception a model which Plato used to contrast judgement to perception.
96
 
The importance of the contrast to Plato shows Aristotle’s epistemological concerns 
and places him at a distance from Plato in this respect.
97
 Burnyeat claims that 
Aristotle is applying the wax block model directly to perception as a way of insisting, 
against Plato, that perception is awareness, articulate awareness, from the start; and 
therefore is capable of leading to knowledge.
98
 Aristotle’s use of the wax block model 
is successfully exploited by Burnyeat, whose interpretation rests on the claim that the 
effect of the object on the organ is the awareness.  
 
Aristotle could also be anticipating our reading of his theory of phantasia in De 
Anima 3.3 here.
99
 Further evidence for this implication is in his phrase immediately 
following in De Anima 3.2; that is why even when the objects of perception are gone, 
perceptions and images are still present in the sense-organ.
100
 This indicates a 
connection between the faculties of perception through the ability to perceive that we 
see and hear, for example, through the reception of the form of the sense-object, 
which then remains in the perceptual faculty made possible by phantasia and made 
accessible by the capability of our memories.
101
 In this case the interpretation would 
lead to a claim that the image, or form, of the sense-object is taken into the soul’s 
memory bank by the perceptual faculty, which includes, for example, seeing, by 
virtue of the eye which is affected by the action of the sense-object.
102
 This is an 
interesting claim to consider; however since it is not directly related to my subject 
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matter I will not follow up on this here. The question of how this perceiving that we 
perceive occurs and the question of how this is affected by the sense-object are 
simultaneous questions, just as they are simultaneous phenomena.
103
 To determine 
whether perceiving that we perceive is consciousness we must address both concerns 
in detail, bearing their connection in mind.   
 
Aristotle’s repetition of his actuality theory emphasises his point that the organ 
and the potentiality for sensing are identified, but their essential nature is not the 
same.
104
 This discussion is reminiscent of the chapter in the Physics where what 
causes change and what is changed are both one and not one.
105
 The Unity of the 
process of conscious perception is shown in all these examples, where Aristotle states 
that in actuality these things which in essence are different, in potentiality and 
actuality are the same, are one simultaneous and harmonious moment of consciously 
perceived perception.
106
 Aristotle explains that this is how in one sense a thing is 
acted upon by like and in another by unlike; for while it is being acted upon it is 
unlike, but when the action is completed it is like.
107
 This raises the problem of 
whether this means that it is a literal change that occurs or rather a more figurative 
change where perception becomes ‘like’ its objects.
108
 The way in which the sensing 
becomes like the sense-object is in a way acted on simultaneously by like and unlike; 
for sensing is like the object potentially, while unlike it in essence.
109
 Aristotle means 
that the sense becomes like its object only in the moment of actual perception, in the 
completion of the potentiality of the perceptual episode.
110
 This is similar to, and 
supported by, Myles Burnyeat’s interpretation of this matter. He states that all these 
physical-seeming descriptions; the organ’s becoming like the object, its being 
affected, acted on or altered by sensible qualities, its taking on sensible form without 
matter, are referring to what Aquinas calls a ‘spiritual’ change, a becoming aware of 
some sensible quality in the environment.
111
 Aristotle exemplifies his meaning with 
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this example; a builder is present to build a house, bricks are there to be built into a 
house.
112
 The potentiality for a house is there, the actuality of the bricks makes the 
house possible with their reality, but the form of the bricks must receive the input of 
the builder for the house to become complete. Everything is acted upon and moved by 
something which produces an effect and actually exists,
113
 although the second 
actuality which is the actual episode of perception is not possible without the 
existence of both the actual sense-object and the potential perceiver.
114
 This is clear in 
the Physics also, where, in the example, the steep ascent and the steep descent are 
inseparable, they are one, but are described differently.
115
 These differing perspectives 
are reminiscent of the difference between Aristotle’s and ours. We cannot help but 
look from the perspective of the perceiver, yet Aristotle theorises from the perspective 





Aristotle’s theory of perception in general in De Anima 2.5 describes this 
exceptional method of alteration,
117
 which is reminiscent of De Anima 2.2 where 
Aristotle argues that changes from first to second actualities are unique in that the 
move to second actuality preserves and completes the nature of the capacity, while in 
other types of change the original state is destroyed in the process.
118
 Since the faculty 
is potentially what the object is actually, there are no object-independent 
characteristics to be lost in the transition from dispositional to occurrent cognitive 
state and, as Modrak states clearly; object-dependent characteristics are actualised, not 
lost, in the change.
119
 Of the four kinds of change: of quantity, of quality, of 
substance, and of place;
120
 coloured in a way is an exception, a special kind of change 
different from all of these,
121
 a change from first actuality to second actuality.
122
 The 
example Aristotle chooses to use is one of teaching and learning,
123
 where the one 
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teaching is the object acting and the one learning corresponds to the subject of 
perception; the perceiver in the perceptual process is the one who is changed in this 
subtle and non-physical manner.
124
 The double meanings of hearing and sounding are 
the uses of the words in, and out, of our presence: meanings of potentiality and 
actuality.
125
 One process is in the object and one in us, although the meanings are not 
equally accurate, for though sounding is actual, sound as a perceptual process is only 
potential until it begins to produce change in a hearer who moves from simply 
possessing a potentially hearing capacity, to being involved in an episode of actual 
hearing.
126
 In this Aristotle’s theory of the actual and potential, activity is prior to 
capacity.
127
 What is capable of hearing sounds, for example, is only potentially 
hearing until a resounding occurs at the same time that the hearing capacity is able to 
hear the actual sound.
128
 A sound may resound with no one to hear it but no one may 
hear what is not sounding;
129
 however if there is no sound to hear there can be no 
hearing.  
 
This is clear in Aristotle’s exposition that whenever that which can hear is active 
and when that which can sound is sounding, then the active hearing happens at the 
same time as the actual sounding: we may call these audition and sonance. This also 
seems to refer to the example in the Physics, where steep ascent and steep descent are 
described differently, though they are the same.
130
 In Aristotle’s discussion of the 
moment of actualisation it becomes clearer how the perceptual faculty becomes the 
same as its objects in actuality.
131
 The difference between the sort of effect that scent 
has on air and the effect it has on an organ is that the latter effect is the perceiving of 
something, the former the becoming of something perceivable.
132
 It appears that 
actuality is the natural condition of the object: the object is there to be seen. The fact 
that these happen at the same time provides unity to the process. Its inseparable parts 
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The debate over how our perception of perception takes on characteristics of the 
‘perceived’ is an important part of determining how Aristotle thinks that we perceive 
that we perceive and for the purposes of this paper, an important part of determining 
whether this theory of Aristotle’s can correspond to any part of our contemporary 
view of consciousness. Richard Sorabji was the originator of this debate with his 
claim that perceiving involved a literal physiological change.
134
 There have been a 
number of supporters to this position, for example, Stephen Everson, who specifies 
Aristotle’s theory of receiving the sensible form without the matter does not entail the 
absence of any material change, but only a change in which the particular material 
constitution of the thing sensed is irrelevant to the occurrence of sensing.
135
 It is a 
kind of perception which entails a material alteration involving awareness.
136
 This 
position does not deal with Aristotle’s explanations adequately, in my opinion, 
because of Aristotle’s explanation of the perception of common sensibles. To make 
use of Everson’s example, we are not simply aware of the colour red, but of the colour 
red in the certain texture of the featheriness of the robin’s chest in the size and shape 
of the bird at the particular moment of its chest moving in and out as its lungs 
underneath the exterior of the bird expand and contract. The particular material 
constitution of the robin is not irrelevant to the episode of sensing, if colour is to 
literally affect the sense-organ and through this action, the perceiving of this, then it is 
the whole perceptual picture that is simultaneously perceived, and this is why 
Everson’s explanation and the literalist’s position cannot be what Aristotle is 
intending. In this view I support Miles Burnyeat’s interpretation that the only 




The faculty versus activity debate and the literalist versus spiritualist debate are 
intertwined with one another and are inseparable. These positions have an interesting 
reflection on Aristotle’s ‘difficulty’ in De Anima 3.2. In the context of Aristotle’s 
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discussion of perceiving that we see and hear we must assume that consciousness as a 
part of the perceiving faculty will become coloured also by the object of sight at the 
same time, and in the same way.
138
 Burnyeat uses Aristotle’s example of touch to 
show the consequences of accepting a literal change interpretation, that for Sorabji it 
will be the heart that hardens, not the hand: flesh on Aristotle’s view is the medium, 
not the organ of touch.
139
 He instead theorises that the taking on of the form of the 
object is a becoming aware of some sensible quality in the environment.
140
 Aristotle is 
not a literalist, Burnyeat maintains that the eye’s taking on a colour is just one’s 
becoming aware of some colour and uses as support for his position emphasis on 
Aristotle’s remark in De Anima 2.5 that the alteration in a sense-organ is of a special 
kind and is not the sort of alteration as in a change of quality, for example when a 
green thing becomes red.
141
 Aristotle in Physics does not classify this sort of change 
as an alteration, and perception in De Anima 2.5 is explained not as a change from a 
potential to an actual but a change from an actualisation of the first level to the second 
level.
142
 Therefore I agree with Burnyeat, that the sense-organ is not so much altered 




One’s position held in this debate will influence the way Aristotle’s first worry is 
interpreted; the worry about how perception becomes coloured by the sense-object 
during perception. Aristotle argues against the theory that there are no sense-objects 
without a sensory being there to perceive them, in favour of the weaker theory stating 
simply that perception requires something to perceive.
144
 By arguing against the 
stronger claim in favour of the weaker Aristotle disagrees with those philosophers 
who in the past have supported the stronger claim. In one sense the earlier 
philosophers were right and in one wrong: they were right in terms of the actual 
existence of the terms but not right in terms of the existence of their potentialities.
145
 
They were mistaken in speaking singly about terms which have more than one 
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meaning, they did not know about the existence of the potential and the actual, so they 
did not make this distinction. 
 
The actuality theory is what unites the perceptual faculty in all its abilities and 
activities. The right proportions must coincide at the right moment in the right 
environment for perception to actually occur, otherwise all the faculties remain in 
their states of potentiality.
146
 This connects inextricably the perceiver and perceived in 
their environment. Kosman’s example of the smelly onion in his fridge imbuing the 
uncovered cheese with its onion-like smell, is used as an attempt to illustrate how the 
onion would act on the nose and the faculty of smelling, causing it to take on the 
matter-less form of the vegetable.
147
 However, smelling does not take on the form of 
an onion in the same way that the cheese in Kosman’s fridge does, for perception is a 
two-way process and the nose also must re-actively receive the smell of the onion as 
the onion acts on the nose and is aware of this.
148
 The action of smelling refers to the 
whole actuality of the process of an episode of perception, not just what the nose 
does, but what the nose, smell, reflexive awareness and the suitable conditions of air 
do, together.  
 
How this happens is stated by Aristotle in De Anima 3.2 in Aristotle’s discussion 
of sumphonia and logos.
149
 Aristotle repeatedly says that being acted upon has 
multiple meanings, sometimes this is a form of destruction by a contrary, but 
sometimes a preservation of a potential by an actual that is like it.
150
 When this 
section of De Anima 3.2 is compared to De Anima 2.5 it becomes clearer what 
Aristotle means when he states that it is because hearing must be a proportion that 
excess, high and low pitch for example, destroy hearing,
151
 and that hearing and sound 
so spoken of must be saved and destroyed simultaneously.
152
 This connects the theory 
of the potential and the actual with the theory of logos and harmony. In actuality voice 
must be concordant in some manner for it to be audible. Yet, what this means is 
unclear, because we are able to hear a cacophony. The object becomes sound that is 
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audible and the hearing is receptive of this in one harmonious instance. This must be 
the kind of concordance Aristotle is hinting at, the harmoniousness of the actual act of 
perception. This is an extension of De Anima 2.8 with the addition of an extra ability 
which involves a logos.
153
 Our faculty must have a tool for receiving this composite. 
The form minus the matter in hearing can relate to single notes as well as complex 
combinations of notes for common sensible perception between senses. It is this 
power, which can perceive the simple and the composite at once, and by the same 
means, that I am trying to extract from Aristotle’s text.  
 
When Aristotle says that harmony is a kind of voice,
154
 and that voice has 
meaning, at least this instance, it seems an object of perception attributes meaning to 
the moment of perception and thus the involvement of some sort of conscious 
attention is implied.
155
 However, we know that voice can have meaning without us 
knowing what that meaning is, for example when one listens to a speaker of a 
language they have not learned. So meaning cannot come from the object, voice, but 
rather must come from the ensouled perceiver. This can necessitate no conscious 
attention per se; for in Aristotle’s theory this kind of consciousness is a natural and 
merely re-active move in response to the action of the sense-object in episodes of 
perception; and in learning, through regular habituation.  
 
The consciousness of perception is here however, imbued with an additional 
level, corresponding to our more focussed definition of consciousness. In De Anima 
2.8 Aristotle says that phonē, voice, is produced only by an ensouled creature, who 
does this discriminately.
156
 He appears to claim through this natural process the soul is 
the conscious agent of this action; making voice distinctive because of the agency of 
the soul, determined by the action of the perceptible object. This consciousness which 
is necessarily present in every perception could be seen to be attentive through the 
logos which must accompany every perceptual process of the second actuality.
157
 The 
necessity for sumphonia to be the right proportion for it to be received fully by our 
senses applies to all the senses and entails a relationship of agreement. This follows 
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from Aristotle’s actuality theory; as both the sounding object and the potentially 
hearing subject must be in active actuality for perception to occur, so must the right 





The destruction of perception by excess can be read with either a weak or a 
strong meaning. To read the line to mean excess ‘makes perception not possible’ is 
weaker than the possibility of excess physically destroying it. The weaker reading 
here implies that the pitch is either too low or too high for perception to be possible as 
actualised. However, there is a difficulty with this interpretation. The word Aristotle 
uses to describe the destruction of perception innately has a strong meaning; it is the 
word he uses to mean ‘passing away’ in his theory about ‘coming to be and passing 
away.’ Phtheiresthai here, is the same verb which Aristotle uses for death, for 
absolute destruction of being, indicates that after this, all that there is, is ex-
perception. It is unclear how this could happen, and what the destruction applies to. A 
possible explanation could be that the example be taken as another instance of actual 
and potential perceiving, where excessive pitch or volume make the actualisation of 
the perceptual episode unable to move into the second state of actualisation. Just as a 
child who tries to force a puzzle piece into a hole that does not fit that piece, I imagine 
that a noise which does not fit into our auditory hole, for example, damages either the 
faculty which was not made to receive that particular breadth of shape, or the 
possibility for actualisation, which requires a certain shape. The proportion of one 
side of the episode of perception must agree with the other if they are to harmonise 
into a successful perception. The sense is the ratio, and a discordant object makes 
perception impossible as long as this discord is in place. The potentiality has not been 
actualised rather perception has been destroyed by the excessiveness of the sense-
object. This is how perception in one way can be viewed as destroyed, and in another 
way viewed as saved. The actuality has been destroyed, the potential has been saved. 
Yet the strength of the term phtheiresthai must on this account be explained by the 
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The ability to be able to perceive differences between special sense-objects
160
 
adds a new level to perception. This has an impact on what it would mean for a sense 
to be ‘destroyed’ by a discordant sense-object, for the discordant sense-object could 
be special to one sense, or common to all senses. Could it be possible for something to 
be so discordant that it could destroy all perception at once? If this is what Aristotle 
means then to destroy the ability which is immersed in the perception of special 
sensibles, the perception of these perceptions could destroy our entire perceptual 
consciousness. This joining together of the activities of the perceptual faculty in 
harmonious and proportionate actuality is exemplified in De Anima 3.2 as he leads the 
discussion towards the perception of differences between the special sensibles.
161
 This 
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Chapter 3: Perceiving Common Sensibles 
 
Imagine this: there is a pencil in front of you, but since none of your senses are 
connected by any cross-modal binding ability, there is not just one pencil in front of 
you, there are five. A blue pencil seen by your eyes, a hard pencil touched by your 
fingertips, a woody smelling pencil sniffed by your nose, a pencil which sounds 
surprisingly hollow listened to by your ears, and a pencil that tastes stringent like its 
painted covering are all that you perceive. This nightmare could easily happen if there 
was no unifying faculty for the individual senses. Each perception must be presented 
to one agency, and this for Aristotle, appears to be the common sense. This power of 
the perceptual faculty is able to be described as kexōrismenon and axōriston, separate 
and not separate, because of its unifying ability.
162
 It is one, but within its content it is 
not one. Aristotle’s example that the same faculty also perceives that good and bad 
are different is used to show the instantaneous and simultaneous nature of these 




De Anima 3.2 raises things which the theory of perception as it stands in De 
Anima 2.5 cannot deal with. Hence it seems that Aristotle theorises the power of the 
common sense as a power which can assist the standard abilities of perception. In De 
Anima 2.6 Aristotle says that the ‘object of sense’ is used in three ways: two we 
perceive directly and one indirectly.
164
 The first two are; an object proper to the given 
sense which cannot be perceived by any other sense, and an object perceptible by all 
the senses. The third kind are incidentally perceived objects, where the percipient is 
not acted on by this thing perceived as such, but must accompany an active, actual, 
properly and directly perceivable object.
165
 The objects which are common to all 
senses are movement, rest, number, shape and size.
166
 The ability to perceive 
differences between special sensibles is said by Aristotle to be perceptual because the 
subject-matter is perceptual.
167
 We do this by means of an ability shared by what it is 
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that perceives that we see and hear.
168
 Perception is held to be a change of state, but as 
has been previously said, not just any change of state, a unique kind.
169
 I am in 
agreement with Modrak’s reading; that the actuality theory makes the awareness of an 
object a necessary feature of a cognitive act, and it also makes the character of a 
mental act dependent upon its object.
170
 The character of sensing is determined by its 
object, so the sensing cannot be the object of any further awareness except in relation 
to the sense-object that gives it its character.
171
 What we gain by being aware of our 
ability to perceive these differences is a better understanding of our own perceptual 
awareness. In response to Aristotle’s theory it has been noted as significant that in the 
case of the senses and their proper objects the account turns on the descriptions of 
how the world is subjectively experienced, how it smells, tastes, and sounds.
172
 The 
combination of these perceptible experiences is what forms our perceptions of things 
as the things that they are and the recognition and distinction between these differing 
sensible qualities is what makes the unity of these possible and this shows that for 




It is a popular view amongst commentators that all of the functions in this 
discussion of perceiving that we perceive are attributable to a ‘common sense,’ yet 
these critics each express their view slightly differently. Kahn thinks the De Anima 
and Parva Naturalia form a continuous and progressive exposition of one single 
unified faculty of perception.
174
 Modrak claims the common sense is simply the 
capacity for joint activity by the five senses.
175
 Everson replies to these that the point 
is not that the common sense is possessed by the special senses jointly, but precisely 
that it is possessed in common by those senses and so not specific to any.
176
 In 
response to these readings Gregoric more recently claimed that the senses are not 
integrated at the level of perception at all, but at the level of thought. This view is 
based on the thesis that the soul operates itself by itself in addition to using the senses 
to perceive, for example the soul applies common features such as ‘same’ and 
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‘difference’ to the impressions received through the senses, and thus discriminates 
them.
177
 Gregoric claims that this is an active response on Aristotle’s part to avoid the 
disaster-scenario of the separation of the senses by postulating a separate power over 
and above the five senses which monitors their states and coordinates their reports, the 
common sense.
178
 So, whereas Kahn and Modrak have claimed that the unity of 
perceptual consciousness is made possible by the activities of the common sense,
179
 
Gregoric claims the unity of consciousness is due to a higher capacity of the soul, the 
noetic faculty.
180
 I feel that Modrak’s postulation is more correct in terms of the 
Aristotelian context; that Aristotle extends the functions of perception to make 
knowledge possible in connection to the world, and therefore increases the importance 
of perception greatly. Modrak notes that in De Anima 3.2 Aristotle exploits the notion 
of simultaneous realisations of the potential for being perceived as possessed by the 
object to argue that there is a single realisation of both; seeing, the second actuality of 
sight, and colour as perceived, the second actuality of colour, are one and the same.
181
 
The claim Aristotle makes for the simultaneous realisation of perceptual self-
consciousness together with the perceptual act is the driving force of his theory that 
consciousness is associated with the sensory capacity. Thus he claims, against Plato’s 
ridicule of this notion in the Charmides,
182
 that the single event that from one point of 
view is seeing and from another colouring,
183
 makes consciousness in this instance 
perceptual, and necessary to perception. 
 
Thus this ‘common sense’ cannot be interpreted as a special faculty. Aristotle 
dedicates the whole first chapter of book three to this point, that there are no senses 
other than the five. There is no separation within the perceptual faculty of the soul just 
as there is no separation of faculties within the soul. Anything spoken of as if divided 
is such only conceptually.
184
 Illustrations of how perceptual unity is achieved are 
presented quite differently by each modern reader of the texts under consideration. 
Kahn denies that there is any suggestion that the several senses that perceive shape are 
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related to a common faculty in De Anima 2.6, and treats this as confusion between 
‘common sensibilia’ and ‘common sense’, referring to De Anima 3.1 to affirm that 
there is no sixth sense.
185
 Kahn’s solution to the double aporia presented at the 
beginning of De Anima3.2 is to view the faculty of perception as a single thing with 
each sense protruding from the main faculty, unifying them all, like a tree with five 
branches.
186
 In De Anima 3.2 Aristotle considers two aspects of the reflexive act by 
which the sense faculty takes its own operations as its object: awareness of perception 
as such, and differentiation of the content of perception.
187
 Modrak incorporates both 
of these into her interpretation of the ‘common sense,’ as a faculty made up of all the 
senses.
188
 The functions of koinē aisthēsis are particularly diverse and on Modrak’s 
interpretation include: the perception of the common sensible, reflexive awareness or 
perception, judgements about the unity of complex sense-objects, and discrimination 
of differences among proper objects.
189
 Modrak theorises that the common sense is 
the point at which the special senses converge,
190
 similarly to Kahn’s thesis, and that 
this is how these phenomena are possible. The common sense is, as Aristotle says, 
one by number but different with responses to different kinds of forms.
191
 However, it 
seems more correct to me to say that the unifying abilities which the senses have in 
common are realised through the process of actualisation, not effected by a ‘common 
sense’ entity, but rather as abilities common to multiple senses.
192
 We may call these 
abilities ‘common-sensical’, but not originating in any kind of ‘common sense’ 
faculty.   
 
The impact this discussion and theory have for the overall concern with how we 
perceive that we see and hear is brought out by the implication that being reflexively 
aware of seeing is itself a kind of seeing.
193
 This would complicate matters in terms of 
Aristotle’s primary concerns in his introduction of the passage. Modrak says that in 
this way Aristotle adds another function to the functions of the special senses and this 
complicates the conception of a special sense, for a special sense can no longer be 
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defined simply in terms of its proper objects.
194
 However I do not agree with this 
since it is not clear that Aristotle’s theory of perceiving that we perceive is another 
instance of ‘seeing.’ Therefore the special senses remain definable by their objects 
and the ability to perceive this is incorporated as a simultaneous part of this action, its 
object being the entire act of second-actuality perception. Hence there is no need for 
Modrak to ascribe a different notion to the account in De Somno.
195
 In De Anima 
Aristotle is considering reflexive awareness in isolated special senses whereas in De 
Somno he considers how the object of reflexive awareness results from the 
convergence of several senses under a common faculty which unites them all.
196
 By 
theorising that it is not “by sight” that we perceive that we see in De Somno I think 
that Aristotle means that it is not directly by the power of perceiving the special 
sensible of sight, but through the power of sight, and hearing and all the rest that we 
are aware of perceiving these differences. It must mean this, for if it meant by the 
perception of the special sensible concerned solely with sight there would be no 
common sensing. Thus Aristotle indicates a power enacted through common sensing, 
in which case the two accounts are therefore compatible in respect of their content. 
Modrak thinks that this awareness cannot be a function of one or several of the special 
senses because this would only be so if the object of experience were a collection of 
sensory fragments rather than an integrated whole and since it is rather an inseparable 
part of the cognitive activity which occurs simultaneously it is clearly a function of 
the common sense.
197
 However Aristotle shows us in De Anima 3.2 that we are aware 
of the activity of each sense through that sense because of its sensible, and aware of 
common sensibles through the commonness which connects each of these in the 




In higher animals it is always the case that more than one sense is active at any 
given moment. In this case it is not possible for there to be no cross-modal perception. 
Cross-modal perception is only one aspect of the power we attribute to 
consciousness.
199
 Yet on the topic of animal consciousness, we are in a very grey 
area, for Aristotle does not specify human psychology of perception to the exclusion 
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of animals, though he certainly includes higher species of animals in his discussion of 
perception. We are informed that some animals do not have phantasia, but it is not 
clear whether they possess the ability to discern differences of common sensing. This 
is another thing that makes me reluctant to accept the common sense as in any way a 
faculty in its own right. If animals do not have phantasia then they cannot store their 
perceptions as memories like humans can. This seems to indicate that the animals may 
possess some of the abilities attributed to common sensing but not others, and implies 
that ability to judge complex objects based on common sense is on a par with the 
higher faculty of phantasia, and not available to all animals.
200
 Hardie and Kahn 
disagree on this matter, Hardie emphasising the differences between perception in 
animal and man,
201
 and Kahn minimising them to create a less anthropocentric 
interpretation of Aristotelian consciousness.
202
 Modrak says that if human 
consciousness involves the joint activity of the perceptual and noetic faculties, the 
internal structure of human consciousness will not be the same as the internal 
structure of animal consciousness.
203
 So it seems she is right in her remark that we are 
not able to decide on the basis of textual evidence how Aristotle would have dealt 




Modrak’s theory emphasises the importance of the discussion of harmony
205
 to 
claim that the unity of the perceptual capacity is brought about by the logos of each 
sense, the capacity possessed by a bodily organ to respond to a large range of sensible 
features.
206
 The exercise of a sense is the actualisation of the logos of opposite 
qualities that defines the sense-object in question,
207
 this logos is a direct consequence 
of the actuality theory. The notion of a logos does double duty here for it also explains 
the unique character of the particular colour under consideration: we experience red, 
not so much white and so much black.
208
 It appears that a logos of sensible qualities 
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determines the unitary character of the individual sense-object.
209
 Since the active 
sense is one with its object, it too must be a logos when actualised, and potentially a 
logos when unexercised capacity. Some commentators restrict the usefulness of the 
logos doctrine to certain physiological responses; or sense-objects. I agree that the 
literal interpretation is very unfitting here
210
 in the terms of the actuality theory being 
explicated at its most intricate level. The inextricable connection of the subject and 
the object in perceptual processes dispels any Cartesian worries one might have while 
reading Aristotle’s psychological works. This reveals something of the uniqueness of 
conscious experience. We need objects to be conscious of.
211
 We are not simply 
floating consciousnesses isolated in a Cartesian void. The fact that some perceptual 
activities still do not have names
212
 shows the inattention of present-day science to the 
part the sense-object plays in perception. The most important thing for Aristotle 
seems to be that all things in the world work together according to their own purposes. 
Not just for Aristotle however, it is important for humans and animals, plants and 
minerals that all of these processes work together. 
 
The unity of the nature of the perceptual theory has led interpreters to claim that 
Aristotle’s theory connects with our conception of conscious experience.
213
 The 
senses actually converge, on concrete experience, in the unifying and discriminating 
activity of a single point. It is because of this central union, ‘consciousness,’ that the 
special senses are able to share in the ‘common perception’ of the same common 
sensible, as well as to perceive one another’s objects incidentally in a single 
simultaneous act.
214
 The actuality theory makes the awareness of an object a 
necessary feature of a cognitive act; it also makes the character of a mental act 
dependent upon its object, an interpretation with which I agree.
215
 Aristotle uses his 
actuality theory to explain how the psychological and the physical phenomena can 
occur simultaneously.
216
 Aristotle uses the example of a point to illustrate how this 
can be both one and two by being the same thing, indivisible and instantaneous in 
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action, but being used twice to mean two things at once, and perception and thought 
are of this kind.
217
 And so as it treats the limit as two, it discerns two things, as being 





So, there is a common sense but it is a part of all the individual senses and hence 
a part of the world, thus on Aristotle’s theory our consciousness about the world is 
connected to the presence of the world inseparably. The special senses overlap qua 
faculties and also in a single momentary act: the common root agency is implicit but 
not explicit, as Kahn usefully remarks.
219
 I support the view that there is no separate 
‘common sense’ faculty, only a shared set of abilities which are common to the 
senses. On this view there is no special sense organ for the common sensibles, but 
they are true sense objects, perceived per se and not incidentally, they are objects of a 
common sense, an ability shared by all the senses. Yet this can be spoken of as a 
common sense because of the joining together of the senses in the conscious ability to 
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It is clear that Aristotle has some notion of consciousness as we conceive of it 
now, though this is not a notion that covers all contemporary intuitions about the 
topic. These cover: sentience; wakefulness; self-consciousness; what-it-is-like to be a 
certain creature or individual; being a subject of conscious states, experiencing 
transitive consciousness. There are also varieties of state consciousness, and the issue 
of consciousness existing as an entity.
220
 Aristotle appears to be able to fulfil certain 
understandings of sentience, wakefulness, self-consciousness i.e. consciousness of 
itself as consciousness, and perceptual transitive consciousness. I have argued against 
those that attribute signs of what-it-is-like to Aristotle’s theory of perceptual 
consciousness, and also against those who see in his theory a possibility for a 
consciousness determined by one’s conscious states. The issue of consciousness 
existing as a separate entity is not a possible reading of Aristotle, and is one of his 
most beneficial departures from Plato’s, and consequently Descartes’, theory of 
philosophy.  
 
Aristotle’s concern with general perceptual awareness of our conscious 
interactions in the world includes not just the cross-modal perceptual awareness of 
differences between sense-objects, but also the discernment of what these connections 
amount to. The recognition of how components of experience fit together could be 
viewed as what forms the character of consciousness as we understand it. However, 
the modern notion of consciousness includes the reflexive awareness of the self as 
well as reflexive awareness of momentary states of consciousness. Armstrong’s 
example of the truck driver’s lack of reflex, or introspective proper, shows this 
modern consciousness theorist’s view that the highest level of consciousness, 
belonging solely to humans, is the ability to consciously introspect.
221
 This important 
part of the modern conception of consciousness is achieved in Aristotle’s theory of 
perceiving that we perceive, where our awareness of our own perceptions, and thus 
our self-consciousness of this kind, are essential to perception. Modrak says 
Aristotle’s notion of reflexive awareness can accommodate the creation of a link of 
conscious experience to what-it-is-like to be that organism, through the connection 
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between reflexive awareness of transitory psychological states and reflexive 
awareness of self as a product of such states.
222
 My doubt is not that Aristotle’s theory 
can accommodate this connection, but whether he intended it to. I disagree with 
Modrak’s interpretation here. I do not think that we can justifiably attribute such a 
definition of consciousness to Aristotle who based conscious states on continuity of 
involvement in the activity of the perceived object, instead of understanding 
consciousness of self as defined by the states it was concerned with. Aristotle had no 
worries about consciousness as a separate entity precisely because he had no concept 
of consciousness as a subject of conscious states in its own right. This I think is one of 
the most attractive characteristics of Aristotle’s theory. 
 
A number of critics have claimed that there is no theory of consciousness in 
Aristotle’s perceiving that we perceive, including such notable scholars as Burnyeat 
and Wilkes for example. Aristotle connected human beings and animals inseparably 
to their surroundings by linking conscious human processes in actuality to external 
perceptual objects. It is simply incorrect that as an Aristotelian in this contemporary 
setting we would have to stop believing that the emergence of life or mind requires 
explanation.
223
 Aristotle goes to great and effortful lengths to explain the existence of 
life and mind, simultaneously. It is this discussion that I think can be particularly 
relevant and interesting to contemporary thinkers who find this subject of interest.  
 
In my discussion concerning consciousness in this paper I have shown that 
Aristotle’s theory of perceiving that we perceive opposes the literalist position: the 
one that leads many commentators to the conclusion that Aristotle was an ancient 
functionalist. I have also conveyed that if Aristotle’s physiological theory of 
perception receiving the form of the sense-object is not to be taken literally then there 
is still much that we can learn from his theory. For instance, if awareness of our 
perceptions as such is an integral part of perceptual processes and is an important 
process connecting us to our surroundings, and these processes happen throughout our 
waking life, then it must be vital to comprehend these to assist in improving 
understanding about humanity and raise understanding of interactions of this kind. 
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 This view partially supports Charles Kahn, Deborah Modrak and K.V. Wilkes 
in their interpretations of the unity of consciousness. Wilkes’s preference for a theory 
that unifies the psychological with the physiological theories is a view I share. Wilkes 
notes a key merit of the Aristotelian account of the psuchê when contrasted with the 
mind to be its emphasis on activity, particularly social activity.
224
 This is contrasted 
with the Cartesian solipsism of consciousness.
225
 Activities are emphasised in 
Aristotle’s discussion as the unifier of the perceptual processes. Aristotle achieves this 
through the reactivity of consciousness in response to the activity of the sense-object; 
creating a theory of two-way activity in the actualised processes of perception. There 
is no need to assign a separate faculty to the common sense, and Aristotle’s notion of 
the perceptually conscious psuchê certainly can contribute to the contemporary 
understanding of the conscious mind. Modrak notes correctly that the difference 
between our and Aristotle’s consciousness concerns the direction of causality.  
 
The actuality principle leads Aristotle to the opposite conclusion from the 
conception nowadays: the unified object of experience produces the unified mental 
activity as opposed to the unity of experience being a consequence of the unity of 
apperception. This distinguishes Aristotle’s position from Plato’s, Descartes’ and to 
the extent that we are heirs of Plato and Descartes, from our conception of 
consciousness as well. The Aristotelian conception leaves no room for a homunculus 
who receives the reports of the various faculties and is the ultimate source of 
consciousness.
226
 However this difference can benefit contemporary thought, helping 
us to conceive of consciousness as a connecting factor between us and the world we 
interact with. The unity of consciousness is achieved in the perceptual faculty. As a 
result of his foundational principles, Aristotle is in a position to give an adequate 





Corresponding to the modern day explanation of consciousness are parts of 
Aristotle’s theory of reflexive perceptual awareness of the ability to perceive, as well 
as of our actual actions of perceiving transitory episodes. With this view I support 
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Victor Caston in his activity reading of perceiving that we perceive in De Anima 3.2. 
The theory of the complex nature of cross-modal perceptual awareness in transitory 
episodes of perception is also related to contemporary conceptions of consciousness. 
The actuality and logos theories, with their focus on the object of perception are a way 
of connecting the perceiver to the perceived object via the consciousness of 
perceiving. In Aristotle’s examples from his discussions of reflexive awareness the 
actualisation of the moment of perception due to the activity of the object and the 
complexity of cross-perceptual awareness present a harmonious theory of perceptual 
consciousness. Through his theory of the unity of perception provided by the ability to 
perceive our sensing through each of the five individual senses in complex 
combinations and judgements between these Aristotle creates a holistic picture of the 
harmony of perceptual experiences. He links perceivers to the world they are in by 
connecting them in all their conscious waking states to the things they perceive 
binding them to their experience of the world with the actuality theory. 
 
When we are awake we are always perceiving something. Aristotle’s theory 
contributes to our understanding of consciousness, while suggesting a unifying 
approach which fills our intuitions about consciousness in a way Descartes left us 
anxiously without. The effect consciousness has on the body and this connection 
between body, consciousness and external environment is shown to be the unifier of 
these things. For Aristotle, the essential connection between the perceiver and the 
perceived is achieved through perceptual awareness.  Although contemporarily the 
relation between conscious perceiver and thing perceived is spoken of as a matter of 
conscious experience, Aristotle’s connections with this particular modern intuition are 
far from explicit. Any implications of consciousness of self that appear to be present 
in Aristotle’s discussion of this should be treated carefully, as the clearest 
implications of self-conscious in this theory of Aristotle’s do not seem to carry the 
same intuitions as the topic does now. 
 
Though Aristotle’s theory cannot fulfil all  the expectations of our modern day 
conception and his explanations may not match ours because of our improved 
scientific knowledge, his theory not only  matches many of the abilities we attribute to 
consciousness but it also has several advantages over the current notion of 
consciousness, and allays some of the worries about it. The holism and harmony of 
45/46 
Aristotle’s approach to philosophy are beneficial attributes of his perceptual theory. 
Consciousness is for Aristotle the unifying factor of perceptual processes. It is the 
reactive awareness of our perceptions through soul and body to the world and it 
creates a theory that makes body, soul and world inseparable. Aristotle’s theory is one 
of general perceptual awareness which unifies all the capacities and activities of a 
perceptual act by making the object of perception the actor and the person perceiving 
the object, including all parts of their perceptual faculty, the one acted upon. This 
externalisation of the perceptual process puts Aristotle’s object in the place of the 
modern-day subject, joining together through seamless acts of perception the subject 
and object and thus escaping the post-Descartes pitfall of the isolation of the subject 
through dualism. Aristotle’s psychological theory elucidates a unified view of the 
body and the mind connected by sensation with consciousness pervading the 
physiological and psychological faculties. It certainly is relevant to discussions of this 

































Appendix 1- De Anima 3.2, translated by W.S. Hett. 
-Words in [brackets] are additions by me to clarify the translation where necessary. 
 
t1 - 425b12 - Since we can perceive that we see and hear, it must either be by sight 
itself [that we see], or by some other sense.  
 
t2 - 425b14 - But then the same sense must perceive both sight and colour, the object 
of sight.  
 
t3 - 425b15 - So that either two senses perceive the same object or sight perceives 
itself  
 
t4 - 425b16 – Again, if there is a separate sense perceiving sight, either the process 
will go on ad infinitum or a sense must perceive itself. So we may assume that this 
occurs in the first instance. 
 
t6 - 425b18-20 - but here is a difficulty: for if perception by vision is sight, and what 
is seen either is colour or has colour, then if one is to see that which sees, that which 
primarily sees will also possess colour. 
 
t7 - 425b20-22 - It is therefore obvious that the phrase ‘perceiving by sight’ has not 
merely one meaning; for, even when we do not see, we discern darkness and light by 
vision, but not in the same way. 
 
t8- 425b23-24 - Moreover, that which sees does in a sense possess colour; for each 
sense-organ is receptive of the perceived object, but without its matter.  
 
t9- 425b24-25 - This is why, even when the objects of perception are gone, sensations 
and mental images are still present in the sense-organ. 
 
t10- 425b26-426a1 the activity [actuality] of the sensible-object and the sensation is 
one and the same, though their essence is not the same; in saying that they are the 
same, I mean the actual sound and the actual hearing; for it is possible for one who 
possesses hearing not always be hearing and that which [can] sound not to always be 
sounding. But [whenever] that which can sound is sounding, [and that which can hear 
is active] then the active [actual] hearing happens at the same time as the actual 
sounding: we may call these respectively audition and sonance.  
 
t11- 426a2-5 - if then, movement [change], that is, the acting and being affected takes 
place in that which is acted upon, then the sound and the hearing in a state of activity 
[actuality] must reside in the potential hearing; for the activity of what is moving 
[changing] and active [actual] takes place in what is acted upon. Hence that which 
causes motion need not be moved [itself]. 
 
t12 – 426a6-12 - The activity, then, of the object producing sound is sound, or 
sonance, and of that producing hearing is hearing or audition, for hearing is used in 
two senses, and so is sound. The same account applies to all other senses, and sensible 
objects. For just as acting and being acted upon reside in that which is acted upon, and 
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not in the agent, so also the activity of the sensible object and the sensitive subject lie 
in the latter.  
 
t13 – 426a13-15 - In some cases we have names for both such as sonance and 
audition, but in others, but in others one of the terms is nameless; for the activity of 
vision is called seeing, but that of colour has no name; the activity of taste is called 
tasting, but that of flavour has no name.  
 
t14 – 426a16-19 – But since the activity of the sensible and of the sensitive is [one] 
the same, though their essence is [other] different, it follows that hearing in the active 
sense must cease [be destroyed] or continue [be saved] simultaneously with the 
sound, and so too for flavour and taste and the rest; but this does not apply to their 
potentialities.  
 
t15 – 426a20-24 - The earlier natural philosophers were at fault in this, supposing that 
white and black have no existence without vision, nor flavour without taste. And in 
one sense they were right, but in another wrong; for the terms sensation and sensible 
being used in two senses, that is potentially and actually, their statements apply to the 
latter class, but not the former. These thinkers did not distinguish the meanings of 
terms which have more than one meaning.  
 
t16 – 426a25-426b9 - If harmony is a species of voice, and voice and hearing are in 
one sense one and the same, [and in one sense not so, and if harmony is a proportion], 
then it follows that hearing must also be in some sense a ratio [proportion]. That is 
why both high and low pitch, if excessive, destroy hearing; in the same way in 
flavours excess destroys taste, and in colours the too bright or too dark destroys sight, 
and so too in smelling the strong scent, whether sweet or bitter, destroys smell; which 
implies that the sense is some kind of proportion. And this is why things are pleasant 
when they are brought pure and unmixed into the proportion, for example the high 
pitched, sweet or salt; for in that case they are pleasant. But generally speaking a 
mixture produces a better harmony than the high or a low pitch, and to the touch that 
is more pleasant which can be warmed or cooled; the sense is the proportion, and 
excess hurts or destroys.  
 
t17 – 426b9-12 - And so each sense relates to its sensible subject-matter; it resides in 
the sense-organ as such, and discerns the differences in the said subject-matter, for 
example vision discriminates between black and white, and taste between sweet and 
bitter; and similarly this holds in other cases.  
 
t18 – 426b13-17 - But since we also distinguish white and sweet and compare each 
sense-object in reference to each other, by what sense do we perceive that they also 
differ? Indeed it must be by some sense [by perception]; for they are objects of 
perception. It is clear that flesh is not the ultimate sense organ; for if it were 
judgement would depend on being in contact. 
 
t19 – 426b18-24 - Nor is it possible to judge that sweet and white are different by 
separate [senses], but both must be clear to any one [sense]. For otherwise, even if 
you perceived one thing and I another it would be clear that they differed from each 
other. One thing must assert that they are different; for sweet is different from white. 
The same faculty [thing], then, which asserts this, hence, as is asserts so it thinks and 
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perceives. Evidently, therefore, it is not possible to judge separate objects by separate 
faculties [means].  
 
t20 - 426b25-29 - And it is also clear that it is not possible at separate times either. 
For just as it is the same faculty [thing] that declares that good and bad are different, 
so also when it declares that the one and the other are different, the ‘time when’ is not 
merely incidental (I mean for example ‘I now say that there is a difference’, but do not 
say that there is now a difference’). The faculty says now, and also that the difference 
is now; hence both are different at once [at the same time therefore]. So the judging 
sense must be undivided and also must judge this in an undivided time.  
 
t21 – 426b30-33 - But indeed it is impossible for the same thing to move 
simultaneously with opposite motions, and in an indivisible time. For if the object is 
sweet it moves perception or thought in one way, while the bitter moves it the 
opposite way, and if white in a different way altogether.  
 
t22 – 426b34-427a3 - Is then, that which discerns at the same time both indivisible in 
number and undivided, while divided in essence? Then in one sense it is indeed what 
is divided that perceives divided things, but in another sense it does this being 
indivisible. For it is divisible in essence, but it is indivisible spatially and numerically.  
 
t23 – 427a4-16 - Or is this impossible? For although the same indivisible thing may 
be both contraries potentially, it is not so in essence, but becomes divisible in 
actualisation; the same thing cannot be both white and black at once; and so the same 
thing cannot be affected by the forms of these, if  this is what happens in perception 
and thought. The fact is that just as what some thinkers describe as a point is, as being 
both one and two, in this sense divisible, so too in so far as the judging faculty is 
indivisible, it is one and instantaneous in action, but in so far as it is divisible, it uses 
the same symbol twice at the same time. In so far, then, as it treats the limit as two, it 
judges [discerns] two things, as being itself in a sense distinct; but in so far as it 
judges of it as only one, it judges by one faculty [thing] and at one time.  
 
 
Appendix 2- De Anima 2.5, translated by W.S. Hett 
 
t1 - 416b33- Let us discuss sensation in general. Sensation consists in being moved 
and acted upon, for it is held to be a sort of change of state.  
 
t2 - 416b35-417a3 - Now, some say that like is only affected by like (-the sense in 
which this is possible or impossible has been discussed in the general account of 
acting and being acted upon- On Generation and Corruption, i. 7. 323b18).  
 
t3 - 417a3-14 - The question arises as to why do we not perceive the senses 
themselves as well as the external objects of sense, or why without the stimulation of 
external objects do they not produce sensation… It is clear that the faculty of 
sensation has no actual, but only potential existence. Like fuel which needs a spark to 
set it alight. Since we speak of perceiving in two senses- having the power of hearing, 
as well as when the faculty is actually operative, the term sensation must be used in 
two senses, as potential and as actual. Similarly, to perceive means both to possess the 
faculty and to exercise it.  
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t4 - 417a15-21 - To begin, let us assume that being acted upon and moved is the same 
as exercising the function; for movement is a form of activity, though incomplete, 
(see Physics iii.2, 201b31). Everything is acted upon and moved by something which 
produces an effect and actually exists. Therefore as has been said, in one sense a thing 
is acted upon by like and in another by unlike; for while it is being acted upon it is 
unlike, but when the action is completed it is like.  
 
t5 - 417a22 - We must also distinguish certain senses of potentiality and actuality  
 
t6 - 417a23-b1 - Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of potentiality: a man who can be 
described as knowledgeable because his matter is of a certain kind disposed towards 
the conditions of knowledge (the condition we are born in to DA 2, 417b17-18); and a 
man who holds the knowledge of grammar and is capable of exercising it whenever 
he likes. Each of these men has a capacity for knowledge, but in a different sense. He 
distinguishes these two potentialities from the man who is already exercising his 
knowledge, and so is in actuality knowledgeable and in the strict sense knows, for 
example knows this particular thing. The first two men are both only potentially 
knowledgeable; but whereas one becomes so in actuality through a qualitative 
alteration by means of learning and after frequent changes from a contrary state, the 
other passes by a different process from the inactive possession of sensation or 
grammar to its active exercise. The third man is already in a state of actually 
exercising his knowledge.  
 
t7 - 417b2-7 - Aristotle continues, that even the term ‘being acted upon’ is not used in 
a single sense, but sometimes it means a form of destruction of something by its 
contrary, and sometimes rather a preservation of that which is like it, in accordance 
with the relation of potentiality to actuality; for that which merely possesses 
knowledge comes to exercise it by a process which either is not alteration at all (for 
the development is into its real self or actuality), or else is a unique kind of alteration.  
 
t8 – 417b8-9 - So it is not sound to describe that which thinks as being altered when it 
thinks, any more than it is true to say that the builder is altered when he builds. 
 
t9 - 417b10-19 - That which produces development from potential to actual in the 
matter of understanding and thought ought not to be called teaching, but needs some 
other name; and that which, starting from a potentiality for knowledge, learns and 
acquires knowledge from what is actual and able to teach, either ought not to be 
described as ‘being acted upon’, as has been said, or else there are two senses of 
alteration, one a change to a negative condition, and the other a change to a positive 
state, that is, the realisation of its nature.  
 
t10 - 417b19-27 - Again, actual sensation corresponds to the exercise of knowledge; 
with this difference, that the objects of sight and hearing (and similarly those of the 
other senses), which produce the actuality of sensation, are external. This is because 
actual sensation is of particulars, whereas knowledge is of universals; these in a sense 
exist in the soul itself. So it lies in man’s power to use his mind whenever he chooses, 
but it is not in his power to experience sensation; for the presence of a sensible object 
is essential. The same thing is true pf our knowledge of sensible objects, and for the 
same reason, viz. that sensible objects are particular and external. 
50/46 
 
t11 - 417b28-32 - But there will be a later opportunity to clear our impressions about 
these things. For the moment it will be enough to establish that the term ‘potential’ is 
used with two meanings; first as we might say of a boy that he is a potential general, 
and secondly as we might say of an adult. These two meanings also apply to the 
potentially sentient. [sensing] 
 
t12 - 418a1-6 - But since there is no name corresponding to this difference in 
meaning, and we have now explained that the meanings differ, we must continue to 
use the phrases ‘to be acted upon’ and ‘altered’ as though they were precise terms. 
The sentient subject, as we have said, is potentially such as the object of sense is 
actually. Thus during the process of being acted upon it is unlike, but at the end of the 
process it has become like that object, and shares its quality.  
 
 
Appendix 3- Physics 3, 1-3, on Change/ Movement – translated by R.P. Hardie 
 
t1 - Physics 3.1- 200b10-14 - Nature is a principle of motion and change, and it is the 
subject of our inquiry. We must therefore see that we understand what motion is; for 
if it were unknown, nature too would be unknown. 
 
t2 - 200b26- 33 - Some things are fulfilment only, others in potentiality and in 
fulfilment- one being a ‘this’, another so much, another such and such, and similarly 
for the other categories of being. The term ‘relative’ is applied sometimes with 
reference to excess and defect, sometimes to agent and patient, and generally to what 
can move and what can be moved. For what can cause movement is relative to what 
can be moved, and vice versa.  
 
t3 - 200b34-201a2 - It is always with respect to substance or to quantity or to quality 
or to place that what changes changes. But it is impossible, as we assert, to find 
anything common to these which is neither ‘this’ quantity nor quality nor any of the 
other predicates.  
 
t4 - 201a4-9 - Now each of these belongs to all its subjects in either of two ways: 
namely substance- the one is its form, the other privation; in quality, white and black; 
in quantity, complete and incomplete.  
 
t5 - 201a10-14 - We have distinguished in respect of each class between what is in 
fulfilment and what is in potentiality; thus the fulfilment of what is potentially, as 
such, is motion- e.g. fulfilment of what is alterable, as alterable, is alteration; of what 
is increasable and its opposite, decreasable (there is no common name for both), 
increase and decrease; of what can come to be and pass away, coming to be and 
passing away; of what can be carried along, locomotion. 
 
t6 - 201a15-19 - when what is buildable, in so far as we call it such, is in fulfilment, it 
is being built, and that is building. Similarly with learning, doctoring, rolling jumping, 
ripening, aging.  
 
t7 - 201a20- 23 - The same thing can be both potential and fulfilled, not indeed at the 
same time or not in the same respect, but e.g. potentially hot and actually cold. Hence 
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such things will act and be acted on by one another in many ways: each of them will 
be capable at the same time if acting and of being acted upon.  
 
t8 - 201b7-15 - Each thing is capable of being at one time actual, at another not. Take 
for instance the buildable: the actuality of the buildable as buildable is the process of 
building. For the actuality must either be this or the house. But when there is a house, 
the buildable is no longer there. On the other hand, it is the buildable which is being 
built. Necessarily, then, the actuality is the process of building. But building is a kind 
of motion, and the same account will apply to the other kinds also. 
 
t9 - 3.3, 202a13-20 - It is the fulfilment of this potentiality by the action of that which 
has the power of causing motion; and the actuality of that which has the power of 
causing motion is not other than the actuality of the moveable; for it must be the 
fulfilment of both. A thing is capable of causing motion because it can do this, it is a 
mover because it actually does it. But it is on the moveable that it is capable of acting. 
Hence there is a single actuality of both alike, just as one to two and two to one are 
the same interval, and the steep ascent and the steep descent are one – for these are 
one and the same, although their definitions are not one. So it is with the mover and 
the moved. 
 




Appendix 4: ‘On Sleep and Waking’- translated by W.S.Hett 
 
t1 – 1, 454a5-8 - Any one who is awake is conscious of some stimulus, either external 
or internal. If, then, waking consists in nothing else than the exercise of 
consciousness, clearly it is in virtue of the part by which they perceive that animals 
wake when they are awake and sleep when they are asleep. 
-The ability to perceive and be conscious of either perceptual stimuli (external), or 
intellectual stimuli (internal) is the defining characteristic of a sentient creature. 
 
t2 – 2, 455a13-23 - Now every sense has both a special function of its own and 
something shared with the rest. The special function, e.g. of the visual sense is seeing, 
that of the auditory, hearing, and similarly with the rest; but there is also a common 
faculty associated with them all, whereby one is conscious that one sees and hears (for 
is it no by sight that one is aware that one sees; and one judges and is capable of 
judging that sweet is different from white not by taste, nor by sight, nor by a 
combination of the two, but by some part which is common to all the sense organs; 
for there is one sense-faculty, and one paramount sense organ, but the mode of its 
sensitivity varies with each class of sensible objects, e.g. sound and colour) 
  
 
Appendix 5- On connections between the perceptual and intellective faculties 
 
Modrak discusses the idea that consciousness in Aristotle is not just perceptual, but a 
connecting point for all the psychological faculties, based in the common sense.
228
 
                                               
228 Modrak 1987: 180; cf. pp.56-66 for Modrak’s discussion of  the part logos plays in this connection. 
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Similarly, Thomas Johansen claims that in the context of Aristotle’s attempts to group 
together the perceptual and intellectual faculties, the aim of Aristotle’s argument is to 
show that these phenomena are perceptual against Plato’s rejection of the value of this 
faculty.
229
 These are only two, out of multiple readings of Aristotle which view his 
theory of consciousness as combining perceptual consciousness with the intellectual 
faculty. While I agree that the connections which bind together Aristotle’s theories 
across disciplines through conscious abilities are present and a valuable thing to 
explore in Aristotle’s works, I have chosen to begin my investigations in perceptual 
consciousness because I think that the theory of perceiving that we perceive is where 
the idea of consciousness is centred. I explain my reasons for this throughout the 
discussion in this dissertation.  
 
I would also like to note the possible connection, not just of perceptual consciousness 
to intellectual such, but also to involve imagination and memory at least in my 
reading of Aristotle’s endeavour to explain how consciousness seems to permeate so 
much of our waking existence.
230
 The connection between not only De Anima 3.2, 3.3 
and 3.4, but also the treatises in the Parva Naturalia is apparent. These psychological 
works incorporate theories and principles from other areas of Aristotle’s works, the 
Physics for example, and it will be enlightening for the present discussion to be taken 
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 Johansen 2005: 236 
230 For further discussion, from essays I read and would have liked to have space to discuss in this 
dissertation:  
- On Consciousness in Mind and Imagination: cf. Schofield, M Aristotle on the Imagination 1992; 
Frede, D The Cognitive Role of Phantasia 1992; Wedin, M Mind and Imagination in Aristotle 1988 
 
- On Consciousness and Thought: cf. Kahn Aristotle on Thinking 1992, which was written to 
compliment Kahn’s interpretation of sense-perception in his earlier paper; and Kosman What Does the 
Maker Mind Make 1992 for a discussion of the Active Intellect  
 
- On Consciousness and Memory: cf. Julia Annas, who distinguishes two kinds of memory in On 
Memory: in chapter 1- personal memory, and in chapter 2, On Recollection- non-personal memory. I 
think this discussion is relevant to the issue of whether Aristotle has a conception of conscious 
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